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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON		
3	SMITH & NEPHEW, INCORPORATED,) and JOHN O. HAYHURST, M.D.,)		
4) Plaintiffs,) Case No. CV-04-29-MO		
5	vs. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		
6	ARTHREX, INC.,) December 16, 2011		
7	Defendant.) Portland, Oregon		
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15	Telephone Oral Argument		
16	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS		
17	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL W. MOSMAN		
18	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE		
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25	ALSO PRESENT:	Mr. John Schmieding

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(PROCEEDINGS) THE CLERK: Hello, counsel. This is the time and place set for a telephone oral argument in Case No. 3:04-CV-29-MO, Smith & Nephew, Incorporated v. Arthrex, Incorporated. We do have a court reporter recording these proceedings, so we ask that you identify yourself each time that you speak. And counsel, could you identify yourself for the record. MR. SKENYON: This is Jack Skenyon, Fish & Richardson, for the plaintiff. MR. HERBERT: This is Mark Hebert, also with Fish & Richardson, for the plaintiffs. MS. PITCHFORD: This is Susan Pitchford with Chernoff Vilhauer for plaintiffs. MR. SABER: This is Chuck Saber, and with me is Sal Tamburo and Megan Woodworth for defendant. This is Anthony Cho for Arthrex. MR. CHO: MR. HEUSER: Peter Heuser with Schwabe Williamson

& Wyatt for Arthrex.

THE CLERK: Mr. Schmieding, are you there?

MR. SCHMIEDING: Yes. This is John Schmieding,

general counsel for Arthrex.

THE CLERK: Thank you.

And here is Judge Mosman.

THE COURT: We're here on various motions, the most critical of which is defendant's judgment as a matter of law motion.

Before I continue, are you all getting feedback right now?

MR. SABER: A little bit. I can understand you,
Your Honor, but just a little bit. I think some people may
be on speakers. We're not.

MR. SKENYON: Seems fine to me, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. I'll move forward, then.

Before I make any ruling on these matters or entertain further oral argument, I want to first of all say a couple of things. I'm thankful for the briefing in this matter. It is -- you're to be, all of you, congratulated on the quality of the briefing. It helped me a great deal to read it and refine my thinking.

And we have discussed the briefing in this case on at least one previous occasion -- probably several -- and this very expertly walks the line between zealous advocacy and improper cheap shots and the like, and all on the correct side of the line. So I'm grateful for that.

I'm also -- I don't know if I said this at the close of trial, but I'm appreciative of the professionalism at trial. There were a number of reasons why this trial

posed very difficult challenges for the lawyers, requiring last-minute adaptation of trial strategy, and at least some of them was occasioned by my own failure to see as a claim construction issue what I thought was a fact issue. And I'm -- certainly I'm sure some lawyers would have been tempted to whine about that more than any of you did, so I'm grateful for the way in which you all conducted the trial.

I will say that there may be an element of serendipity in all of this, in terms of what the way this trial played out will give the Federal Circuit in terms of choices.

And lastly, I'm thankful for your assistance with the practical joke that we played at trial. All of you went above and beyond the call of duty. And it's probably just a blip on the screen for you, but it's become minor legend around here. And so as payback for your help to me, I just want you to know that I've greatly exaggerated your singing abilities in the telling of the tale.

All right. Let's take up the JMOL motion.

Here's what I'd like to do. As I said, I have paid close attention to your briefing in this case, and of course it's a matter that we gave a great deal of discussion to during trial. So I'd like you to resist the temptation to argue what you've already written to me. I know the matter is an important one, but let's be candid, it's a

matter that will go to the Federal Circuit on de novo review.

If you feel, in light of all the briefing now in front of you, that there's a point you'd like to either emphasize that you feel was unduly underemphasized, or make a point that you don't think you've had a chance to make yet, then that's why we're here, for that sort of oral argument.

And I'll start with the moving party, Arthrex, on the JMOL motion.

MR. SABER: Your Honor, like I'm sure Mr. Skenyon, I had the opportunity to reread the briefs this week, and frankly, I have very, very little to add to what we said. So I would rest on my briefs. Of course, if the Court has any questions, I would be more than happy to respond and/or to respond to anything that Mr. Skenyon chooses to raise.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Skenyon, how about you?

MR. SKENYON: Just one thing, Your Honor. Since Mr. Saber has the reply brief and gets to respond to us, there's only one thing here that I wanted to address, and that is it seems like that the argument is, to the extent not already made, was that according to Arthrex, it seems to be depending upon a construction here that is based upon an incorrect assumption. They make some statement of, "To

state the obvious, the claim must cover all aspects of a fully functional method for the surgery."

issue?

And that's something we haven't had an opportunity to -- we haven't discussed, we haven't had an opportunity to address before. But I think briefly what I would say would be -- I just direct the Court's attention to the actual claim language. The claims, the independent claims at issue, 1 2, 3 and 6, only Claim 1 refers to attaching the tissue to the suture, and that's so that the tissue can be secured against the bone.

The other independent claims are not for a complete method here, not dealing with the complete surgical method. They stop at the point where the member is simply inserted into the bone here.

So what I'm taking issue with with the statements that I think appear in Arthrex's reply brief, where they talk about stating the obvious, that the claim must cover all aspects of a fully functioning method, and that's not -- it's less than that here in terms of what the actual claim method does cover.

And that's really the only issue I wish to address here that isn't, I think, fully briefed by both parties.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Saber, do you wish to be heard further on that

MR. SABER: Yeah, just very briefly.

I don't think that that's an accurate quote from my brief. What we certainly did say in the brief, frankly, and in our opening brief as well, is that the language of this claim clearly claims an anchor -- well, it's a method for anchoring in bone a member and attached suture.

And when you read the specification with the language of the claim, there's just no doubt -- and this is true for every claim -- that what is claimed is a suture anchor that works, that does what the -- what both common sense and the specification says.

I mean, I don't quibble with what Mr. Skenyon says, that you don't have to call out every step, but this is a claim that clearly calls out what the anchor does, that it anchors the member in bone to perform the surgery. That's the point that we made, and that's the point we made in our opening brief and we made in our reply brief, and we believe that's consistent with the language of the claim, as well as plainly the specification of the -- as explained in the specification.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Once it became clear that there were two choices regarding claim construction at the third trial, then what to do followed two different paths. We took at trial choice A, which we'll just as a way of shorthand refer to as Smith

& Nephew's claim construction. And we now know that a jury would find for Smith & Nephew on that theory, on that claim construction.

Arthrex, among the various theories for its motion for judgment as a matter of law, seeks judgment as a matter of law even under Smith & Nephew's claim construction, arguing that even on that theory, no rational jury could find for plaintiff.

And I deny the motion for judgment as a matter of law on that particular theory. In other words, I would uphold the jury's verdict on the claim construction presented to it, which we've called Smith & Nephew's claim construction.

Arthrex also says that -- again, in the teeth of the jury's verdict in this case -- I should nevertheless grant motion for judgment as a matter of law on indirect infringement and also on willfulness.

And I rarely -- and perhaps never before -- have granted a motion for judgment as a matter of law on an issue decided by a jury on a factual basis, but I have to call them like I see it, and here I agree with Arthrex, that despite this jury having done so, no rational jury could find indirect infringement for the reasons stated by Arthrex, nor could any rational jury find willfulness in this particular case. And I rely again on Arthrex's

arguments, and in particular on iLOR v. Google.

More fundamentally, what the jury didn't get was choice B; that is, Arthrex's theory of claim construction.

And I made it pretty clear at trial and now hold that Arthrex's proposed claim construction made right at the start of trial was the correct one, and I hold that, of course, under that claim construction no rational jury could do anything other than find for Arthrex on infringement.

In that same line of reasoning, of course, if I didn't grant JMOL on that claim construction, a new trial would be necessary, and of course for those reasons that I've just given, those holdings, I deny Smith & Nephew's motion for bill of costs for fees for a permanent injunction and for enhanced damages.

I invite Arthrex to submit a proposed judgment after sending it first to Smith & Nephew, and any other post-trial motions necessitated by this ruling. Those are due no later than January 18, 2012.

Anything further from Smith & Nephew today?

MR. SKENYON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: From Arthrex?

MR. SABER: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you all. Good day.

(Proceedings concluded.)

--000--I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature or conformed signature is not certified. /s/Bonita J. Shumway 12/22/2011 BONITA J. SHUMWAY, CSR, RMR, CRR DATE Official Court Reporter